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NOTES
cations latent in these restrictive type zoning ordinances be over-
looked. The people living in small communities need not concern
themselves with the possibility of churches overrunning their village.
The percentage of people of a particular denomination residing in
that community, plus the cost of building a church, will keep their
number at a minimum. Conversely, if this legislation were upheld,
it would theoretically be possible to legislate this country into atheism.
But rather than await a judicial determination by the Supreme Court,
a more speedy and efficient remedy has been resorted to by the State
of Massachusetts. This jurisdiction has enacted a state-wide statute
which declares invalid any ordinance prohibiting the use of land for
church purposes.62 Such a declaration of public policy should be
promulgated in all the states, and this will prevent the enactment of
this bigoted legislation.
SOME ASPECTS OF PUBLIC BIDDING LAW IN NEW YORK
Introduction
Public bidding contracts are those entered into after submitting
advertisements to the public and executed between a successful bid-
der and the state, its political subdivisions or agencies. They are
governed, in general, by the principles applicable to all contracts and,
whenever such instruments come before the courts, the rights and
obligations of the contracting parties will usually be adjusted on the
same principles as if both were private persons.' A statute requiring
competitive bidding is based upon motives of public economy and of
the mistrust of the officers to whom the duty of making contracts for
the public service was committed. Such a statute or charter is de-
signed to preclude favoritism and jobbing,2 and to protect the con-
stituent body from corruption and improvidence.3 While public con-
tracts are, in general, governed by the same rules as private contracts,
they differ greatly in many respects. Thus, where the defense of
ultra vires will not be sustained in an action on an executed contract
62 "No by-law or ordinance which prohibits or limits the use of land for
any church or other religious purpose or which prohibits or limits the use of
land for any religious, sectarian or denominational educational purpose shall
be valid." MAss. ANN. STAT. c. 325, § 1 (1950).
1 See People ex rel. Graves v. Sohmer, 207 N. Y. 450, 457, 101 N. E. 164,
166 (1913) ; People v. Stephens, 71 N. Y. 527, 537 (1878).2 See Brady v. Mayor of New York, 20 N. Y. 312, 316 (1859).
3 See Donovan v. City of New York, 33 N. Y. *291, *292 (1865).
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by a private corporation,4 that defense, when applied in the strict
sense, will absolutely preclude recovery from a municipal corpora-
tion.5 Similarly, while private contracts rarely fall within the ambit
of statutory control, public contracts are, in the main, subject to such
control as to their subject matter, formation and execution. Certain
public contracts, which are prohibited by law, would raise no ques-
tion of legality if executed by private persons. Thus, a contract for
patented articles is prohibited unless entered into under such cir-
cumstances as would allow fair and reasonable opportunity for
competition. 6
In general, any public contract may be required to be let by pub-
lic bidding. There are, however, certain services or supplies which,
by their nature, could not be the subject of competitive bidding. Con-
tracts calling for the professional services of stenographers,T archi-
tects,8 engineers,9 and surveyors; 10 for patented articles where no
statutory prohibition is applicable; 11 for public utilities; 12 and for
the leasing" or purchase of land or easements 14 in land, are not
within the provisions of such statutes.
With these distinctions as a basis, a synopsis of the major New
York statutory and decisional law on this subject will be attempted
with a view toward assisting contractors and their advocates in the
successful prosecution of public bidding contract actions in this state.
The following analysis will be limited to a consideration of state con-
tracts, and will omit treatment of such instruments executed by the
Federal Government or its agencies.
4 Bath Gas Light Co. v. Claffy, 151 N. Y. 24, 45 N. E. 390 (1896) ; Whit-
ney Arms Co. v. Barlow, 63 N. Y. 62 (1875).
5 Lyddy v. Long Island City, 104 N. Y. 218, 10 N. E. 155 (1887); cf.
Wadsworth v. Board of Supervisors, 217 N. Y. 484, 112 N. E. 161 (1916)
(taxpayer's action to enjoin payment for services rendered under ultra vires
contract).
6 N. Y. CITY CHARTER § 348; N. Y. CANAL LAW § 31; Barber Asphalt
Paving Co. v. Willcox, 90 App. Div. 245, 86 N. Y. Supp. 69 (1st Dep't 1904);
see Warren Brothers Co. v. City of New York, 190 N. Y. 297, 83 N. E. 59
(1907) passin.
7 O'Brien v. City of Niagara Falls, 65 Misc. 92, 119 N. Y. Supp. 497 (Sup.
Ct. 1909).
8 People ex tel. Kiehm v. Board of Education, 198 App. Div. 476, 190
N. Y. Supp. 798 (4th Dep't 1921); see Horgan & Slattery v. City of New
York, 114 App. Div. 555, 559, 100 N. Y. Supp. 68, 71 (1st Dep't 1906).
9 Vermeule v. City of Corning, 186 App. Div. 206, 174 N. Y. Supp. 220
(4th Dep't 1919), aff'd men., 230 N. Y. 585, 130 N. E. 903 (1920).
'9See People ex rel. Smith v. Flagg, 17 N. Y. 584, 587 (1858).
11 Matter of Dugro, 50 N. Y. 513 (1872).
12Harlem Gas-Light Co. v. City of New York, 33 N. Y. 309 (1865);
Gleason v. Dalton, 28 App. Div. 555, 51 N. Y. Supp. 337 (2d Dep't 1898).
"3 Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Mayor of New York, 4 Bos. 80 (N. Y.
Super. Ct. 1859).
'14 New York Central R. R. v. Westchester, 173 App. Div. 263, 159 N. Y.
Supp. 560 (2d Dep't 1916), aff'd inem, 224 N. Y. 646, 121 N. E. 880 (1918).
[ VOL. 27
NOTES
Statutory Control
As indicated above, the degree of statutory control over public
bidding contracts is an important element in distinguishing them from
private contracts. This control may be the result of state constitu-
tional provisions, state legislation, municipal charter provisions, and
municipal ordinances, or a combination of any or several of them.
Certain statutory provisions have an overall controlling effect. For
example, Section 15 of the Public Works Law requires all contracts
for public works involving an expenditure of over $2,500 to be let
by public bidding. Section 2513 of the Education Law requires com-
petitive bidding before any contract for school construction or repair
exceeding $1,000 is executed by a city of less than 125,000 popula-
tion. But while there are no provisions in any law applying to the
construction of schools in villages or towns, Section 15 of the Public
Works Law would control where such contract exceeds $2,500, in-
asmuch as its provisions apply not only to state work, but to that of
each of its political subdivisions3r5 However, where a specific statute
provides for a figure higher than a minimum of $2,500,16 that par-
ticular law governs. This is in accordance with the rule of statutory
construction that, where a particular and a general law apply to the
same subject, the former takes precedence over the latter.17
Much of the litigation arising out of public contracts results from
the fact that they are often executed in ignorance of other statutory
requirements which must be read in parim nteria with the particular
statute which the parties think is controlling. An additional com-
plication arises due to the fact that certain statutes or ordinances
conflict with pertinent constitutional provisions and are thereby in-
valid.1 8 In New York, for example, there exist two constitutional
provisions controlling public bidding contracts. Section 3 of Article
15 19 requires all contracts for the construction or repair of canals to
be let, after due advertisement, to the lowest bidder.20 The second,
15 Maribu v. Nohowec, 161 Misc. 944, 293 N. Y. Supp. 457 (Sup. Ct.
1937).
16 N. Y. PUBLIC AuTHoRrrms LAW §§ 1138, 1714. All statutes hereafter
cited will be those of New York State.
17 See Sheehan v. City of New York, 37 Misc. 432, 433, 75 N. Y. Supp.
802, 803 (Sup. Ct. 1902).
1s Gordon v. New York, 233 N. Y. 1, 134 N. E. 698 (1922) ; see Weston
v. New York, 262 N. Y. 46, 52, 186 N. E. 197, 200 (1933).
19 "All contracts for work or materials on any canal shall be made with
the persons who shall offer to do or provide the same at the lowest price .. "
20 Where the statute requires the contract to be let to the "lowest bidder,"
the courts generally construe this term to mean the "lowest responsible bidder."
"That term [lowest responsible bidder] does not mean one who is only pecuni-
arily responsible but one who also possesses moral worth .... It implies skill,judgment and integrity as well as sufficient financial resources." Picone v.
City of New York, 176 Misc. 967, 969, 29 N. Y. S. 2d 539, 541 (Sup. Ct.
1941).
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and more important provision, is Section 10 of Article 921 which
prohibits the award of extra compensation to contractors. The courts
have construed this provision as outlawing remedial bills to relieve a
contractor from the consequences of a bad contract,2 2 or to compen-
sate a contractor for extra material or labor supplied as a result of
an error in his estimate,23 or where increased costs have rendered
the contract an unprofitable or a losing proposition.24 Likewise, it
has been construed as invalidating contracts wherein the public agents
agreed to increase the compensation 25 or to indemnify a contractor
for damages occasioned by increased costs.2 6 Inasmuch as there is
no general constitutional mandate to let contracts to the lowest bidder
(with the exception of canal construction), the validity of public con-
tracts can be determined by looking at the applicable statute.
Necessity for Letting
Public bidding contracts fall into two categories: those which,
by statute, must be submitted to competitive bidding, and those which
are submitted pursuant to permissive statutes. The first category
may be further subdivided into three groups. The first of these has
an absolute requirement to let the contract to the lowest, or lowest
responsible, bidder,27 and frequently provides that the contracting
officer may, in his discretion, reject all bids and readvertise. Statutes
in the second group are only relatively mandatory and are qualified
by language permitting an alternative method of award.2 8  Those in
21 "The legislature shall not, nor shall the common council of any city, nor
any board of supervisors, grant any extra compensation to any public officer,
servant, agent or contractor." (emphasis added).
22 See Bates Chevrolet Corp. v. New York, 192 Misc. 151, 157, 76 N. Y. S.
2d 718, 723 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
23See Weston v. New York, 262 N. Y. 46, 52, 186 N. E. 197, 200 (1933).
24 Gordon v. New York, 233 N. Y. 1, 134 N. E. 698 (1922).
25 T.J.W. Corp. v. Board of Higher Education, 276 N. Y. 644, 12 N. E.
2d 800 (1938).26 McGovern v. City of New York, 234 N. Y. 377, 138 N. E. 26 (1923);
Whale Oil Co. v. New York, 266 App. Div. 1043, 44 N. Y. S. 2d 778 (1943),
reargwnent denied, notion for leave to appeal denied, 267 App. Div. 841,
47 N. Y. S. 2d 275 (3d Dep't 1944).
27 CANAL LAW § 30; GENERAL MUNICIPAL. LAW § 120-1; COUNTY LAW
§211; CoNsERvAToN LAW §§417, 482-g, 534, 657; EDUCATION LAW §§2513,
2556(10) ; PUBLIC AUT.ORITIEs LAW §§ 890, 1138, 1406; SECOND CLASS CITIES
LAW § 120; STATE FINANCE LAW § 135; TOWN LAW §§ 197, 222.
28 A. ".... except that no contract shall be awarded to a bidder other than
the lowest responsible bidder without the written approval of the comptroller."
HIGHWAY LAW §§38(3), 126, 194(3); PUBLIC BUILDING LAW §8(6) (with
minor variations); STATE PRINTING LAW § 4(1) ; STATE FINANCE LAW § 174.
B. "Except in an emergency . . . ." COUNTY LAW § 408(2).
C. ". . . unless the authority shall determine that it is for the public
interest that a bid other than the lowest bid should be accepted." PUBLIC
AUTHORITIES LAW §§233(2), 258(2), 283(2), 309, 1069, 1088, 1108, 1141.
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the third group, however, while providing for public letting, have no
requirement that the contract be let to the lowest bidder, but permit
an award to be made in the discretion of the contracting officer.29
With the exception of the Conservation, Public Works and Village
Laws, the sections in this third subdivision provide that the contracts
be let in accordance with the law of the individual county, city, or
municipality in or near which the work is to be done.
In all three subdivisions, however, the sections are inapplicable
where the work to be done, or the supplies to be purchased, involve
an expense less than the specified minimum sum. Where such a
minimum is set, the provision requiring public letting cannot be
evaded by dividing the work into parts, and contracting separately
for each, thereby bringing them individually under the minimum.
Where it has been attempted, such contracts have been held illegal.80
Extra Work
A difficulty arises where the contract is for the performance of
work as distinguished from the purchase of supplies or materials.
In the former, the contractor is often faced with the possibility of
having to do extra work either as a result of some error or default
on the part of the public body, or in compliance with an unjustified
demand by a public agent charged with directing the project. Where
the extra work is necessitated by the error or default of the public
body, the contractor may recover damages 31 However, if it is done
in compliance with a demand by a public officer, no recovery may
'be had if the work is performed voluntarily.32 On the other hand,
if the contractor duly objects and performs the work under protest,
it was held that he could recover, not on the theory of extra com-
pensation under the contract, but rather on the theory of damages
D. ". . . but failure to comply with this section shall not invalidate such
contracts." Id., §§ 506, 559, 635.
E. .... provided, that by majority vote of the members of the authority
the requirements of this section may be dispensed with upon a finding that
compliance with its provisions would be detrimental to the best interests of the
authority or that competitive bidding is not practical." Id., § 1714.
F. Or a combination of (A) and (D). Id., §§ 530, 1381.29 CowsVATiox LAW § 458; EDUCATiON LAW § 2556(6); PuBuc AUTHOR-
irms LAW §§ 659, 1451, 1469, 1488, 1508, 1526, 1572, 1606; PUBLIc WoRXs
LAW § 15; Vn.LAGE. LAW § 266.30 Walton v. Mayor of New York, 26 App. Div. 76, 49 N. Y. Supp. 615
(1st Dep't 1898).
31 Horgan v. Mayor of New York, 160 N. Y. 516, 55 N. E. 204 (1899);
Mulholland v. Mayor of New York, 113 N. Y. 631, 20 N. E. 856 (1889);
Messenger v. Buffalo, 21 N. Y. 196 (1860).
32 Stanton v. New York, 103 Misc. 221, 175 N. Y. Supp. 568 (Ct. Cl. 1918),
aff'd mere., 187 App. Div. 963, 174 N. Y. Supp. 922 (3d Dep't 1919).
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for a breach of contract.33 In this case the measure of damages was
the amount recoverable in quantum mneruit for the extra work done.34
This liberal doctrine, however, was modified in Borough Construc-
tion Co. v. City of New York 35 so as to allow recovery only where
the dispute was a reasonably debatable one. It was held that, since
the contractor knew the extra work was -not required by the contract,
no recovery could be had, as he should have refused to perform and
sued immediately for breach of contract, recovering quantum reruit
for work already done plus prospective profits.3 6 However, it is sub-
mitted that to compel the contractor to resort to the latter remedy is
inequitable since it puts him in the position of having to make the
judicial determination of what the contract requires. If he refuses
to continue, he runs the risk of being in default, should the court de-
termine that the work was within the contract. If he continues under
protest, he runs the risk of being unable to recover if the court finds
it was clearly outside the contract, notwithstanding the contractor's
bona fides to the contrary. The better rule would be that of the
Borough Construction Co. case, modified to the extent that the con-
tractor may recover if he bona fide entertains a doubt, and not, as it
has been construed, if a reasonable man would so doubt. The im-
plementation of such a subjective standard-"the doctrine of white
heart and empty head" as it has been called 87 -would place the job
of contract construction where it belongs, in the courts.
Where the specifications call for certain work and the contract
is awarded to a bidder on that basis, a supplemental instrument exe-
cuted for the performance of substantially different extra work with-
out letting is illegal.88  Similarly, contracts were held to be illegal as
to the parts not submitted to competitive bidding where the specifi-
cations called for bids on part of the work, but set unit prices for
other parts."0 Some modern bidding statutes have obviated these
difficulties by authorizing the insertion of "contingencies and extra
work" clauses which, without the necessity of reletting, permit the
3 Gearty v. Mayor of New York, 171 N. Y. 61, 63 N. E. 804 (1902);
Anderson v. New York, 103 Misc. 388, 175 N. Y. Supp. 229 (Ct. Cl. 1918).
But cf. Becker v. City of New York, 176 N. Y. 441, 68 N. E. 855 (1903)
senible.
84 See Borough Construction Co. v. City of New York, 200 N. Y. 149, 155,
93 N. E. 480, 483 (1910); Nugent v. New York, 265 App. Div. 549, 555, 40
N. Y. S. 2d 361, 367, rearguinent granted, 266 App. Div. 759, 41 N. Y. S. 2d
956 (3d Dep't 1943) ; Lentilhon v. City of New York, 102 App. Div. 548, 557,
92 N. Y. Supp. 897, 902 (1st Dep't 1905), aff'd mere., 185 N. Y. 549, 77 N. E.
1190 (1906).
35 Borough Construction Co. v. City of New York, supra note 34.
36 Weil Plumbing Corp. v. New York, 294 N. Y. 6, 60 N. E. 2d 18 (1944).
37 CHAFEE, SIMPSON AND MALONEY, CASES ON EQUITY 388 (3d ed. 1951).
8 Matter of Rosenbaum, 119 N. Y. 24, 23 N. E. 172 (1890) ; cf. Brady v.
Mayor of New York, 20 N. Y. 312 (1859).
39 Matter of Merriam, 84 N. Y. 596 (1881) ; Moynahan v. Birkett, 81 Hun
395, 31 N. Y. Supp. 293 (2d Dep't 1894).
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contracting officer to execute supplemental contracts for extra work
in an unlimited amount,40 or up to a specified percentage of the au-
thorized contract price.41
Illegal Contracts
The question of recovery under illegal contracts is daily litigated
in the courts. The term "illegal" is often used synonymously with
"ultra vires" and "unauthorized." 42 Ultra vires in the broad sense
includes both illegal and unauthorized contracts.43 Illegal contracts
are those either expressly prohibited by law, or prohibited unless exe-
cuted sub modo et forina of the law. In addition, illegal contracts
include those outside the scope of corporate authority (strictly ultra
vires), and those against public policy.44 An illegal contract is
utterly void and no recovery may be had either on the contract itself
or on an implied contract, since a public body cannot ratify its il-
legality, nor be estopped from denying its validity.43 Thus, even
where the contract is executed and the benefits have been received
by the public, no recovery can be had, even in quantum nzeruit, since
the law will leave the parties where it finds them.4 6 However, where
the subject matter of the void contract is materials or chattels, the
contractor may recover them in specie if they retain their original
identity.47 The law does not favor forfeitures, and where there has
been a bona fide performance of the contract of which the public has
had the benefit, there is a strong equity in favor of the contractor
seeking his compensation. 48 The courts, therefore, will sometimes
try to find an enforceable contract. Thus, where a town had con-
tracted for the purchase of a steamroller in violation of law, the con-
tract was held illegal and unenforceable.40  Nevertheless, the con-
tractor was allowed to recover quantum mzeruit on the theory of an
40HIGHWAY LAW §§38(9), 126, 194; CANAL LAW §30(9); PUBLIC Au-
THOlRITIEs LAW §§ 530, 1381.
41 PuBLIC AUTHORITImS LAW §§233(2), 258(2), 283(2), 309, 1069, 1088.
1108, 1138, 1141.
42 See Bath Gas Light Co. v. Claffy, 151 N. Y. 24, 31, 35, 45 N. E. 390.
391, 393 (1896); Bissell v. Michigan S. & N. I. R. R., 22 N. Y. 258, 259-73
(1860).43 DoNNE.LLY, LAW OF PtuLic CoNTRAcTs § 51 (1922).
44 Ibid.
45 Matter of Niland v. Brown, 193 N. Y. 180, 85 N. E. 1012 (1908).
46 Dickinson v. City of Poughkeepsie, 75 N. Y. 65 (1878) ; Parr v. Village
of Greenbush, 72 N. Y. 463 (1878); McDonald v. Mayor of New York, 68
N. Y. 23 (1876). But cf. Ocorr & Rugg Co. v. City of Little Falls, 77 Anp.
Div. 592, 79 N. Y. Supp. 251 (4th Dep't 1902), aff'd inemn., 178 N. Y. 622,
70 N. E. 1104 (1904).
47 See Smith v. Newburgh, 77 N. Y. 130, 137 (1879); La France Engine
Co. v. Syracuse, 33 Misc. 516, 519, 68 N. Y. Supp. 894, 897 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
48 See Moore v. Mayor of New York, 73 N. Y. 238, 248 (1878).
49 Shoemaker v. Buffalo Steam Roller Co., 165 App. Div. 836, 151 N. Y.
Supp. 207 (4th Dep't 1915).
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implied contract to lease the machine. Similarly, where a statute pro-
hibited the erection of a school house without the prior approval of
the Commissioner, the builder was allowed to recover, since, as the
court stated, the law did not prohibit making the contract, nor the
payment thereunder, but only the erection of the building which,
having already been built, could not be restrained.50
The great majority of illegal contracts are those which are pro-
hibited unless executed sub modo et forma of law. Thus, where the
statute requires the contract to be awarded to the lowest bidder,51 or
to be executed in writing,52 no enforceable legal obligation arises for
work performed or materials provided under an oral contract, or one
awarded without bidding, or to one other than the lowest bidder.
"The state has chosen to enact something similar to the Statute of
Frauds for its own protection .... If there is no contract, there is no
liability." '3 The provisions of a statute prescribing the manner of
contracting are mandatory, and a contract made in violation thereof
is illegal and void.54 Although it has been stated that the defense of
illegality need not be pleaded and that, if the facts develop it, the
court will not enforce the contract but will, on its own motion, take
notice of its illegality, 55 the rule in New York is to the contrary.56
Unauthorized Contracts
An unauthorized contract is one whose subject matter is within
the scope of corporate power, but is invalid because of a defect or
want of power in the contracting officer, or because the power is de-
fectively or irregularly exercised. 57 Such contracts are void and un-
enforceable; but where there is no positive prohibition of law, they
are the subject of ratification or estoppel giving rise to an implied
contract to pay for services rendered or materials supplied. 58 The
theory of such an implied contract is that, inasmuch as it was within
the scope of corporate authority and could originally have been exe-
cuted by the public body, its adoption binds the municipality to pay
a reasonable price for the benefits thus received. 59 If the subject
50 Benedict v. Van Dusen, 221 App. Div. 304, 223 N. Y. Supp. 152 (3d
Dep't 1927).
5 Dickinson v. City of Poughkeepsie, 75 N. Y. 65 (1878).
52 See Belmar Contracting Co. v. New York, 233 N. Y. 189, 194, 135 N. E.
240, 241 (1922).
53 Ibid.
54 Parr v. Village of Greenbush, 72 N. Y. 463 (1878) ; McDonald v. Mayor
of New York, 68 N. Y. 23 (1876).
5 DONNELLY, LAw OF PUBLIC CONTRAcrs 102 (1922).
56 Ocorr & Rugg Co. v. City of Little Falls, 77 App. Div. 592, 79 N. Y.
Supp. 251 (1902), aff'd inem., 178 N. Y. 622, 70 N. E. 1104 (1904).57 DoNNEIY, op. cit. supra note 55, § 51.58Kranrath v. Albany, 127 N. Y. 575, 28 N. E. 900 (1891).
59 Peterson v. Mayor of New York, 17 N. Y. 449 (1858).
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matter is within the scope of authority, yet no recovery is allowed on
an implied contract, the reason is not that a public body cannot be
subjected to an implied contract, but rather that it was illegal or
against public policy, or that the parties had failed to comply with
the manner of execution specifically provided for by law. The dis-
tinction between failure to execute a contract sub modo et forna of
law and a mere irregular exercise of powers concededly possessed,
is often disregarded when the contract has been bona fide performed
and the requirement omitted was unsubstantial or technical. Thus,
where the municipal charter required the common council to publish
in all the papers an ordinance adopting a resolution to pave certain
streets, and the council omitted to publish in one paper and subse-
quently awarded the contract to the plaintiff, it was held that such
an omission was merely an irregular exercise of its powers and, as
between an innocent contractor and the city, the latter could not set
up its misgovernment as a defense.60 Similarly, where the statute
required the city agency to make an appropriation before contracting
and the agency neglected to do so, it was held that the omission was
not a question of lack of power, but rather an irregular exercise of
such power. 61 However, the caveat must be made that in the over-
whelming majority of cases, strict compliance is demanded, and even
mere technical deviations from the statute will bar recovery. In New
York, remedial legislation has been passed enabling persons who con-
tract with a city to press equitable claims against it arising out of
illegal, but executed, contracts, or for extra work not recoverable at
law under a valid contract.62
Remedies of the Bidder
A. Equitable Rescission and Damages for Refusal to Contract
Where a statute or the specifications require a bond or other se-
curity to be given to insure the proper execution of the contract after
acceptance of a bid, the contractor cannot withdraw his bid without
forfeiting his deposit.63 The purpose of such deposit is to indemnify
60 Moore v. Mayor of New York, 73 N. Y. 238 (1878).
61 Van Dolsen v. Board of Education, 162 N. Y. 446, 56 N. E. 990 (1900).
Accord, Sheehan v. City of New York, 37 Misc. 432, 75 N. Y. Supp. 802 (Sup.
Ct. 1902). Contra: People ex rel. Carlin Construction Co. v. Prendergast,
220 N. Y. 725, 116 N. E. 1068, reversing mern., 177 App. Div. 941, 163 N. Y.
Supp. 1128 (3d Dep't), affirming -men., 99 Misc. 8, 163 N. Y. Supp. 583 (Sup.
Ct. 1917); Williams v. City of New York, 118 App. Div. 756, 104 N. Y. Supp.
14 (1st Dep't 1907), aff'd men., 192 N. Y. 541, 84 N. E. 1123 (1908).
62 GENERAL Cirr LAw § 20(5); Matter of Shaddock v. Schwartz, 246
N. Y. 288, 158 N. E. 872 (1927).
63 Matter of Semper v. Duffey, 227 N. Y. 151, 124 N. E. 743 (1919);
Davin v. Syracuse, 69 Misc. 285, 126 N. Y. Supp. 1002 (Onondaga County Ct.
1910), aff'd, 145 App. Div. 904, 129 N. Y. Supp. 1119 (4th Dep't 1911); see
Kimbal v. Hewitt, 2 N. Y. Supp. 697, 698 (Com. P1. 1888), affd, 3 N. Y.
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the public body against the expense of reletting and the damages it
might sustain by being compelled to relet the work at an increased
price through the default of a bidder to execute his contract.64 A bid
is an offer, but contrary to the law of private contracts, cannot be
revoked 65 except on the grounds of mistake,66 or by permission of
the offeree. Moreover, there can be no reformation of the bid in the
absence of mutual mistake.6 7  However, where the acceptance is not
absolute but contingent upon some fact not within the scope of the
advertisement,68 or where the awarded contract is illegal,69 the con-
tractor may withdraw his bid and recover his deposit. Whether a
rescission of the bid and a recovery of the deposit on the ground of
mistake will be allowed, is an equitable question, and, in general,
the courts almost uniformly allow rescission,7" except where there has
been culpable negligence, laches, or where the municipality has been
put to great expense by having to readvertise.71 Notwithstanding a
statutory provision denying the right to withdraw a bid,72 it was held
that the plaintiff could recover his deposit where the city had refused
rescission and readvertised, for an award could have been made to
the next bidder without the necessity of readvertising.73 Where the
contract has been awarded and the petitioner seeks a return of the
deposit, the contract may be rescinded for an error on his part, and
the award made to the next bidder since, in contemplation of law,
the bid was only an apparent offer and, hence, there is no necessity
for readvertisement.7 4 However, where a contractor delayed before
Supp. 756 (Coin. P1. 1889); see Note, [1915A] L. R. A. 225; 1 CoRBIN,
'CoNTRACrS §47 (1951).
64 See Erving v. Mayor of New York, 131 N. Y. 133, 137, 29 N. E. 1101,
1102 (1892).
65 See Matter of Foley Contracting Corp. v. Greene, 108 Misc. 520, 524, 177
N. Y. Supp. 779, 781 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
66 While rescission may be allowed for a mistake of fact, no relief will be
granted where the error is one of law. Matter of Foley Contracting Corp.
v. Greene, 108 Misc. 520, 177 N. Y. Supp. 779 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
67 Thomas J. Buckley Engineering Co. v. McCall, 83 Misc. 603, 145 N. Y.
Supp. 525 (Sup. Ct. 1914); see City of New York v. Dowd Lumber Co., 140
App. Div. 358, 361, 125 N. Y. Supp. 394, 396 (1st Dep't 1910).
68 North Eastern Construction Co. v. North Hempstead, 121 App. Div.
187, 105 N. Y. Supp. 581 (2d Dep't 1907).
69Matter of Harvey v. Duffey, 101 Misc. 641, 168 N. Y. Supp. 814 (Sup.
Ct. 1917), aff'd iner., 182 App. Div. 903, 168 N. Y. Supp. 1124 (3d Dep't
1918).
70 Harper, Inc. v. Newburgh, 159 App. Div. 695, 145 N. Y. Supp. 59 (2d
Dep't 1913); F. W. O'Connell, Inc. v. City of Broome, 198 Misc. 402, 98
N. Y. S. 2d 1009 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
71 See Note, 80 A. L. R. 586 (1932).
72 SECOND CLASS CITIEs LAW § 121 (the prohibition of the statute was
evaded by the court in stating that the plaintiff had never submitted his real
bid).
73 W. F. Martens & Co. v. Syracuse, 183 App. Div. 622, 171 N. Y. Supp.
87 (4th Dep't 1918).
74 F. W. O'Connell, Inc. v. City of Broome, 198 Misc. 402, 98 N. Y. S. 2d
1009 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
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making known the error so as to prevent a restoration of the status
quo, recovery was denied on the ground of laches. 75
Where the advertisement stipulates that the deposit shall serve
as liquidated damages in the event of a refusal to execute the con-
tract after award, such refusal is presumptive evidence of injury and
damages need not be proven.7 6 In such a case, the deposit is the
limit of the contractor's liability,77 but, where the contractor can rebut
the presumption of damages, the deposit may be recovered inasmuch
as it would then clearly be a mere forfeiture.78  Conversely, where
no provision for liquidated damages is made, the contractor will be
liable for actual damages even in excess of his deposit.
By the same token, a bidder to whom an award has been made
may recover damages for a subsequent refusal by the public agency
to execute the contract,79 unless he received no authorized notice of
acceptance,80 or where the award was ultra vires8 1 An unsuccessful
bidder, however, stands in a much different position; he may not
recover damages against the city for merely refusing to award the
contract to him,8 2 as no contractual relation arises until the bid has
been accepted.
B. Damages for Breach
Prior to the adoption, in 1874, of Section 10 of Article 9 of the
New York Constitution,8 3 the legislature was competent to, and fre-
quently did,8 4 enact bills relieving a contractor from damages sus-
75 Brendese v. Schenectady, 297 N. Y. 965, 80 N. E. 2d 355 (1948).
76 Davin v. Syracuse, 69 Misc. 285, 126 N. Y. Supp. 1002 (Onondaga
County Ct. 1910), affd inen., 145 App. Div. 904, 129 N. Y. Supp. 1119 (4th
Dep't 1911).
77See City of New York v. Seely-Taylor Co., 149 App. Div. 98, 103, 133
N. Y. Supp. 808, 811 (1st Dep't 1912), aff'd ment., 208 N. Y. 548, 101 N. E.
1098 (1913).
7SSee Davin v. Syracuse, supra note 76 at 293-294, 126 N. Y. Supp. at
1008; see 5 CoRaix, CoNTRAcTs § 1074 (1951).
79 Beckwith v. City of New York, 121 App. Div. 462, 106 N. Y. Supp. 175
(2d Dep't 1907); Pennell v. Mayor of New York, 17 App. Div. 455, 45 N. Y.
Supp. 229 (1st Dep't 1897); Lynch v. Mayor of New York, 2 App. Div. 213,
37 N. Y. Supp. 798 (1st Dep't 1896); see New York State Construction Co.
v. City of New York, 163 App. Div. 227, 231-232, 148 N. Y. Supp. 129, 132
(2d Dep't 1914), appeal dismissed, 214 N. Y. 653, 108 N. E. 1101 (1915).
so Johnston Heating Co. v. Board of Education, 175 App. Div. 140, 161
N. Y. Supp. 867 (1st Dep't 1916), aff'd mere., 226 N. Y. 592, 123 N. E. 872
(1919).81 Willianms v. City of New York, 118 App. Div. 756, 104 N. Y. Supp. 14
(1st Dep't 1907), aff'd inein., 192 N. Y. 541, 84 N. E. 1117 (1903); accord,
Clarke Co. v. Board of Education, 156 App. Div. 842, 142 N. Y. Supp. 106
(1st Dep't 1913), af'd iner., 215 N. Y. 646, 109 N. E. 1093 (1915).
s2 Molloy v. New Rochelle, 198 N. Y. 402, 92 N. E. 94 (1910).
83 See note 21 supra.
84 See, e.g., People v. Canal Board, 1 Thomp. & C. 309 (Sup. Ct. 1873),
aff'd, 55 N. Y. 390 (1874).
1952] NOTES
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
tained in the performance of public contracts. The typical situation
calling for such relief was that in which state-prepared specifications
included plans estimating the required work under the contract. It
frequently occurred that such representations were erroneous and the
contractor was forced to complete the undertaking at an expense
greatly in excess of that contemplated by the parties. It was early
held that the contractor could not recover on a theory of breach of
contract inasmuch as the statements were not warranties, but mere
representations, which he was under a duty to verify by independent
investigation.85 The contractor was therefore relegated to petition-
ing the legislature to reimburse him for an equitable claim against
the state which ought, in good conscience, to be paid.8 6 Subsequent
to 1874, such bills were prohibited and the claimant could seek re-
covery neither on the contract, nor by relief legislation. Where,
however, the public body was guilty of fraud by deliberate conceal-
ment or active misrepresentation in the plans, damages could be re-
covered notwithstanding a provision wherein the contractor waived
all claims against the statesT As stated by the court, "A contract to
take a thing with all faults does not mean that it is to be taken with
all frauds." 8 But even in the absence of fraud, where independent
investigation would have proved unavailing,8 9 or where the time for
investigation was inadequate,90 the statements were deemed to be
warranties, the breach of which gave claimants an action for damages.
Where the contractor's work was interfered with,91 or where he was
prevented from completing the work,92 an action for damages for
breach of contract was held to lie.
C. Injunction
Section 51 of the General Municipal Law, the "taxpayer's
statute," authorizes a taxpayer to bring an action to prevent waste
or injury to city property, or to enjoin an illegal act of a public
officer.9 3 This remedy is available to any taxpayer regardless of
85 Foundation Co. v. New York, 233 N. Y. 177, 135 N. E. 236 (1922).
86 See, e.g., People v. Densmore, 1 Thomp. & C. 280 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1873).
87 Jackson v. New York, 210 App. Div. 115, 205 N. Y. Supp. 658 (4th Dep't
1924), aff'd men., 241 N. Y. 563, 150 N. E. 556 (1925).88 Yd. at 120, 205 N. Y. Supp. at 662.
89 Faber v. City of New York, 222 N. Y. 255, 118 N. E. 609 (1918).90 See James Stewart & Co. v. New York, 121 Misc. 827, 830, 201 N. Y.
Supp. 334, 337 (Ct. Cl. 1923), aff'd nere., 218 App. Div. 810, 218 N. Y. Supp.
783 (4th Dep't 1926), aff'd mere., 245 N. Y. 638, 157 N. E. 890 (1927).
91 Pearson & Son, Inc. v. New York, 112 Misc. 29, 182 N. Y. Supp. 481
(Ct. Cl. 1920).92 Dean v. Mayor of New York, 167 N. Y. 13, 60 N. E. 236 (1901).
93 GENzRAL MuNmciAL LAW § 51. "All officers, agents, commissioners and
other persons acting . . . for and on behalf of any county, town, village or
municipal corporation ...may be prosecuted, and an action may be main-
tained against them to prevent any illegal official act . . . or to prevent waste
or injury . . .2'
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motive,94 and even in the absence of special injury.95  Thus, such a
suit may be entertained by an unsuccessful bidder,96 or by a com-
petitor of the successful bidder.97  Where the contract is illegal, an
injunction will issue to restrain its award,93 execution,"9 perfor-
mance,100 or payment thereunder after completion.' 0 ' When the
lowest responsible bidder has been determined, a suit for an injunc-
tion will not lie at the suit of a disappointed bidder, for it is pre-
sumed, in the absence of a contrary showing, that the discretion in-
volved in such a determination was honestly exercised,10 2 especially
where the claimant's bid itself was informal.10 3  However, if it ap-
pears that the acts of the official are without power or that collusion,
fraud, or bad faith amounting to fraud was present, relief will be
granted. 04 But if the bid contains certain irregularities which are
waived by the public body and which are not prejudicial to its in-
terests, an injunction will not issue to restrain the letting of the
contract,' °0 inasmuch as such protective statutes were enacted for the
benefit of the public and not to give a disappointed bidder a remedy.' 06
Where the spirit of competitive bidding is prevented, or where the
lowest bidder cannot be determined due to the vagueness of the spe-
cifications, an injunction will lie to restrain the award.10 7
94See Del Balso Construction Corp. v. Gillespie, 225 App. Div. 42, 44, 232
N. Y. Supp. 261, 263 (1st Dep't 1928), aff'd inein., 250 N. Y. 584, 166 N. E.
333 (1929).95 See Morse v. Ereth, 80 N. Y. S. 2d 321, 322 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd mern.,
273 App. Div. 938, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 377 (4th Dep't 1948) (the action was dis-
allowed as the claimant was not a taxpayer).
91 Gage v. City of New York, 110 App. Div. 403, 97 N. Y. Supp. 157 (1st
Dep't 1905) ; see Whitmore, Rauber & Vicinus v. Edgerton, 87 Misc. 216, 224,
149 N. Y. Supp. 508, 513 (Sup. Ct. 1914), aff'd vere., 167 App. Div. 960, 150
N. Y. Supp. 1149 (2d Dep't 1915).
97 Grace v. Forbes, 64 Misc. 130, 118 N. Y. Supp. 1062 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
Is Standard Oil Co. of New York, Inc. v. Morris, 151 Misc. 345, 272 N. Y.
Supp. 442 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
19 Kingsley v. Bowman, 33 App. Div. 1, 53 N. Y. Supp. 426 (4th Dep't
1898).100 Grace v. Forbes, 64 Misc. 130, 118 N. Y. Supp. 1062 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
101 Daly v. O'Brien, 60 Misc. 423, 112 N. Y. Supp. 304 (Sup. Ct. 1908).
102 See Picone v. City of New York, 176 Misc. 967, 970, 29 N. Y. S. 2d 539,
541-542 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
103 Adams v. Ives, 1 Hun 457 (N. Y. 1874), aff'd mem., 63 N. Y. 650 (1875).
104 "... [B]efore a plaintiff in a taxpayer's action can be given relief by
way of an injunction against the acts of an official it must appear that the
acts complained of are without power or that collusion, fraud or bad faith
amounting to fraud exists." Schieffelin v. City of New York, 65 Misc. 609,
617, 122 N. Y. Supp. 502, 508 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
105 McCord v. Lauterbach, 91 App. Div. 315, 86 N. Y. Supp. 503 (1st Dep't
1904).
106 See Martin Epstein Co. v. City of New York, 100 N. Y. S. 24 326, 330(Sup. Ct 1950).
107 Standard Oil Co. of New York, Inc. v. Morris, 151 Misc. 345, 272 N. Y.
Supp. 442 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
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D. Mandamus
Under a statute requiring the contract to be let to the lowest
bidder, the writ of mandamus will issue to compel a public agency to
permit the relator to bid for the contract, inasmuch as the "prequali-
fication" of bidders is violative of the required competition.108 Con-
versely, where no such statutory requirement exists, the courts will
not compel the contract to be awarded to the lowest bidder.10 9 Once
the contractor has bid, he may, by mandamus, compel consideration
of his bid as a "subsisting'" 10 or "valid" 111 offer although no relief
will be granted if the bid fails to conform to the specifications,"
2
i.e., is not a "formal" bid. Where the alleged defect, if corrected,
would have been against public policy, or where there was no com-
pliance with an unconstitutional statute, mandamus issued respec-
tively to compel the acceptance of a bond after award of a con-
tract," 3 and to compel payment under the contract. 11 4  Mandamus
will not lie to compel acceptance if all the bids are rejected 115 or if
only one bid is received." 8
If the complainant is a rejected bidder, the courts will not com-
pel the award of the contract to him, as he has no "clear legal
108J. Weinstein Building Corp. v. Scoville, 141 Misc. 902, 254 N. Y. Supp.
384 (Sup. Ct. 1931); accord, Burland Printing Co. v. La Guardia, 9 N. Y. S.
2d 616 (Sup. Ct. 1938) ("shutting out" a bidder was enjoined as the basis
for disqualification was deemed insufficient).
109 Matter of Dovel Co. v. Lynnbrook, 213 App. Div. 570, 210 N. Y. Supp.
183 (2d Dep't 1925); see Knowles v. City of New York, 176 N. Y. 430, 438,
68 N. E. 860, 862 (1903).
110 See Matter of Kandel v. Greene, 236 App. Div. 607, 608, 610, 260 N. Y.
Supp. 503, 505 (3d Dep't 1932).
I'l People ex rel. George E. Mathews & Co. v. Buffalo, 5 Misc. 36, 25 N. Y.
Supp. 50 (Sup. Ct. 1893).
112 People ex rel. Lord Construction Co. v. Stevens, 67 Misc. 529, 124 N. Y.
Supp. 769 (Sup. Ct. 1910) ; People ex rel. Dinsmore & Wood v. Croton Aque-
duct Board, 26 Barb. 240 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1857).
113 People ex rel. John Single Paper Co. v. Edgcomb, 112 App. Div. 604,
98 N. Y. Supp. 965 (4th Dep't 1906) (The specifications required the use of
a particular union label, and the court held that, since such a requirement
tended to create a monopoly by restricting competition to a particular class of
printers, it was against public policy.).
114 People ex rel. Rodgers v. Coler, 166 N. Y. 1, 59 N. E. 716 (1901) (The
unconstitutional provision of the statute required the contractor to pay his
laborers not less than a specified minimum.).315 People ex rel. McKeever v. Willis, 6 App. Div. 231, 39 N. Y. Supp. 987
(2d Dep't), aff'd inern., 151 N. Y. 640, 45 N. E. 1133 (1896); Halpern v.
Hodgkiss, 89 N. Y. S. 2d 451 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
116 People ex rel. Carlin v. Board of Supervisors of Kings County, 42 Hun
456 (N. Y. 1886). It was held in an early New York case that mandamus
would issue to compel consideration of the relator's bid as the public agency
had no right to reject all bids. People ex rel. George E. Matthews & Co. v.
Buffalo, 5 Misc. 36, 25 N. Y. Supp. 50 (Sup. Ct. 1893). Today this problem
has become almost completely academic as most of the statutes dealing with
public bidding expressly confer on the public officer the power to reject all bids.
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right." 117 In the same breath, the courts have, as a general rule,
refused to compel the execution of a contract to a successful bidder
to whom an award has been made,118 leaving him to his remedy at
law for damages. 119 This dilemma was recognized in an early New
York case, and the court granted the writ to compel the execution
of the contract to the successful bidder.120 Although this is contrary
to the great weight of decisional law, it is submitted that the holding
was a sound one, as it would effectuate the true purpose of competi-
tive bidding.121 Today this problem has become more acute as most
statutes require the execution of a formal contract, and in the absence
thereof, a successful bidder has no standing at law or in equity.
Though a contractor be the lowest bidder, he acquires no rights prior
to the actual awarding of the contract and hence no standing to com-
pel its execution. 122 Despite this settled rule, the recent tendency of
the courts has been to allow review at the suit of an unsuccessful
bidder resulting in the rescission of the illegal contract and com-
pelling its award according to the requirements of law. 123 Thus,
claimants who were denied relief for bona fide claims in the past now
have some standing to compel review of an unjust or illegal award,
but it still seems that the courts are loath to compel the award di-
rectly to the petitioner.12'
"11 Matter of Hilton Bridge Construction Co., 13 App. Div. 24, 43 N. Y.
Supp. 99 (3d Dep't 1897); see People ex rel. Lunney v. Campbell, 72 N. Y.
496, 498 (1878) ; People ex rel. Buffalo Paving Co. v. Mooney, 4 App. Div.
557, 562, 38 N. Y. Supp. 495, 498 (4th Dep't 1896). But cf. Arensmeyer,
Warnock, Zarndt, Inc. v. Wray, 118 Misc. 619, 194 N. Y. Supp. 398 (Sup. Ct.
1922); People ex rel. Vickerman v. Contracting Board, 46 Barb. 254 (N. Y.
1865).
118 People ex rel. Lunney v. Campbell, 72 N. Y. 496 (1878) ; People c.r rel.
Buffalo Paving Co. v. Mooney, 4 App. Div. 557, 38 N. Y. Supp. 495 (4th
Dep't 1896).
119 See note 79 supra; see People ex rel. Ryan v. Aldridge, 83 Hun 279, 282
(N. Y. 1894).
120 People ex rel. Lynch v. Lennon, 147 App. Div. 537, 132 N. Y. Supp. 620
(2d Dep't 1911).
121 See Molloy v. New Rochelle, 198 N. Y. 402, 412, 92 N. E. 94, 98 (1910)
(concurring opinion).
122 ,,... [Pletitioner acquired no substantive rights prior to an actual award,
nor any rights to an award by reason of being the lowest responsible bidder."
Matter of Baitinger Electric Co. v. Forbes, 170 Misc. 589, 590, 10 N. Y. S. 2d
924, 925 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
123 Matter of Dictaphone Corp. v. O'Leary, 287 N. Y. 491, 41 N. E. 2d 68
(1942) ; Matter of Luboil & Heat Power Corp. v. Pleydell, 178 Misc. 562,
34 N. Y. S. 2d 587 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
'124 Application of Cestone Bros., Inc., 91 N. Y. S. 2d 70 (Sup. Ct. 1949)
(this case directed the award to the petitioner), rev'd, Matter of Cestone Bros.,
Inc., 276 App. Div. 970, 95 N. Y. S. 2d 172 (2d Dep't 1950). The case was
reversed as the successful bidder had not been joined in the petitioner's action.
The court intimates that, with both bidders as parties to the proceedings, an
action will lie to direct the officials to proceed in accordance wcith the applicable
statute, with no mention being made of an award directly to the petitioner.
"The courts have been loath to grant mandamus or relief under Article 78,
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Once the award has been made, it has been held that the suc-
cessful bidder may obtain the writ to compel the execution of the
contract pursuant to the terms of his bid as accepted.1 25 However,
where the statute requires the contract to be in writing, it would ap-
pear that mandamus will not lie to compel its execution.120  It has
been held that a bidder was entitled to the writ to compel a return
of his deposit where the award was unauthorized. 2 7 After the con-
tract has been performed, mandamus will lie to compel payment 128
unless it was illegally entered into, in which case payment will not
be compelled.129
Security and Bonds
A. Benefiting the Public
In addition to the statutory requirement that a deposit accom-
pany the bid, the contractor is usually required to furnish security,
in the manner prescribed by the public agency, conditioned on his
faithful performance of the contract. 3 0  Several statutes also provide
that the bidder shall execute a bond with sufficient sureties protect-
ing against any direct or indirect damages suffered on account of the
performance of the contract, and to guarantee the commencement
and completion of the work in the time prescribed by the contract.' 3 '
While the deposit must actually accompany the bid, the security or
the bond is only required to be furnished after the award to the suc-
cessful bidder, but is a condition precedent to the execution of the
formal written instrument. Failure to furnish the security or execute
the bond within the stipulated period is ground for forfeiture of the
deposit as liquidated damages .' 2
The bond and security are intended to save the public harmless
from damages occasioned by the contractor's refusal to perform or
complete the work undertaken. In such cases, the measure of dam-
ages recoverable from the surety is, respectively, the difference be-
tween the contract price and the price for which a new contract must
to contract bidders against public officers . . . ." Martin Epstein Co. v. City
of New York, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 326, 330-331 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
125 People ex rel. Holler v. Board of Contract, 2 How. Pr. (N. s.) 423
(N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1885).
128 Cf. Belmar Contracting Corp. v. New York, 233 N. Y. 189, 194, 135 N. E.
240, 241 (1922).
127 Matter of Harvey v. Duffey, 101 Misc. 641, 168 N. Y. Supp. 814 (Sup.
Ct. 1917), af'd, 182 App. Div. 903, 168 N. Y. Supp. 1124 (3d Dep't 1918).
128 McNutt v. Eckert, 257 N. Y. 100, 177 N. E. 386 (1931).
129 People ex rel. Coughlin v. Gleason, 121 N. Y. 631, 25 N. E. 4 (1890);
People ex rel. McSpeden v. Stoute, 4 Abb. Pr. 22 (N. Y. 1856).
130 CoNsERvATioN LAW § 417; GENRAL MUNICIPAL LAW § 120-1; PUBLIc
AuTHOiTIEs LAW §§233(2), 258(2), 283(2).
131CANAL LAw §30(7); HIGHWAY LAw §§38(7), 126, 194(3); PUBLIC
AUTHOmiTiES LAW §§ 530, 1381.
132See CHARTER OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK § 343(d).
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be made, or the difference between the contract price and the amount
already paid under the contract, plus that required to complete the
work. 3 3 Whether or not the new contract need be submitted to
bidding depends upon the statute and, inasmuch as the public is pro-
tected from loss by an action against the original contractor, or his
surety, most statutes allow the public officer to complete the work
in any way he sees fit.
134
B. Benefiting Laborers, Materialsmen or Sub-contractors
There are no statutory provisions which, by their terms, require
the execution of a bond in favor of laborers, materialsmen or sub-
contractors, protecting them against the contractor's breach or default
in payment. However, it is competent for the public agency to exact
from the contractor a covenant that he will fully perform his con-
tractual agreements with third parties.135 The purpose of such a
covenant, in the absence of a clear intent to the contrary, is to pro-
tect the public against mechanics' liens 136 and not for the protection
of third parties. When such a covenant is inserted, the question
arises as to the right of third parties to proceed against the contrac-
tor's sureties, on the theory of third party beneficiary. 37 It was
held by the Court of Appeals that the security thus exacted was
solely for the benefit of the public, and to permit other persons to
maintain an action would allow a depletion of the security, to the
detriment of the public.' 38 It was subsequently decided, however,
that the public agency might sue upon the covenant, and hold the
proceeds in trust for the unpaid laborers. 3 9  But while no statutory
right is given laborers and other third parties to maintain an action
on the bond, several statutes provide that payments shall not be made
on the contract until the public officer shall be satisfied that the con-
tractor has paid laborers for work done as of the time for payment. 40
This provision allows the public agency to retain a percentage of the
contract price so as to enable the laborer or other third parties to
impose a mechanic's lien upon the fund.' 4' In this manner, the public
agency may pay the lienors the amount due, thereby discharging the
lien and incidentally benefiting the lienors who formerly were rele-
133 CANAL LAW § 32; CONSERVATION LAW § 417; HIGHWAY LAW § 40.
134 CANAL LAW § 32; HIGHWAY LAW § 40.
135 See Johnson Service Co. v. Monin, Inc., 253 N. Y. 417, 421-422, 171 N. E.
692, 693 (1930).
136 For statutory provisions pertaining to mechanic's liens on public im-
provements, see LIEN LAW §§ 5, 12, 42.
137 For development of third party beneficiary doctrine, see Lawrence v.
Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 (1859); Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N. Y. 280 (1877); Seaver
v. Ransom, 224 N. Y. 233, 120 N. E. 639 (1918).
138 Fosmire v. National Surety Co., 229 N. Y. 44, 127 N. E. 472 (1920).
139 Johnson Service Co. v. Monin, Inc., 253 N. Y. 417, 171 N. E. 692 (1930).
140 CANAL LAW § 30(8).
14, LIEN LAW § 5.
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gated to an action against the contractor or an action to foreclose
the lien.1
42
Conclusion
Inasmuch as the preceding analysis was intended to present a
synopsis of the highlights of the public bidding law, a detailed criti-
cism of this subject was not attempted. In conclusion, however, two
facets of the law suggest themselves for brief individual treatment.
While the public contract law is justifiably designed to protect the
public interest, at times it unduly deprives a contractor of a remedy
which, in all fairness, should be allowed, consistent with that aim.
A valid criticism of this body of law, as it exists today, is the ex-
cessive discretionary power lodged in administrative agencies which
tends to impede the operation and thwart the end of bidding statutes,
by denying to contractors the opportunity of proving, before a court
of law, their superior right over a less qualified bidder. If the pur-
pose of the statutes is to obtain the most advantageous terms when
contracting in the public behalf, something less than arbitrariness and
fraud ought to justify judicial review of the administrative action.
The interests of the public are no less prejudiced by an erroneous
award honestly made than by a similar award through fraud and col-
lusion. While recent years have seen increasing access to the courts
by deserving bidders, a more liberal rule would appear to be the
desired object.
Secondly, the defense of ultra vires as applied in municipal con-
tracts is an outmoded and inequitable means to achieve the desired
result. In this day of bureaucratic complexity, the fiction that third
persons are charged with the knowledge of the limits of corporate
authority should not be indulged in to the detriment of innocent
contractors. The problem of proving fraud has never been an in-
surmountable hurdle to the administration of justice and there is no
reason why a bona fide claimant, having performed his contract of
which the public retains the benefits, should not be permitted to
recover at least quantum meruit upon a just claim.
142 Id. § 42. Today, however, laborers are further protected by Section 220-a
of the Labor Law which requires contractors and subcontractors to file a
sworn statement certifying the amounts due and owing to laborers before pay-
ment can be made on the contract. Section 220-b of the same law requires
the appropriate state or municipal official, upon seasonable objection by an un-
paid laborer, to withhold from the contract payment the sum claimed by him
in the verified statement, and to pay the laborer this amount in full discharge
of the obligation.
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